My research is currently focused on defending the idea that normative reasons are more than facts and exploring the consequences of this idea for moral theory. Drawing inspiration from Davidson’s primary reasons, I think that normative reasons are pairs of facts and goals, the contents of pro-attitudes. Because my view recognizes that reasons have both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects, I call it the dual aspect theory of normative reasons. I am interested in exploring how central ethical concepts like moral rightness and moral virtue look from the standpoint of the dual aspect theory of reasons.
More generally, I am interested in broader questions in ethics about the relationship between virtue, duty, and reasons and about how we grasp morality through our emotions. I also have research interests in the philosophy of language, especially concerning modality and expressivism.
I completed my PhD at the University of Southern California's Department of Philosophy. Before attending USC, I studied philosophy at the University of Toronto, principally with Prof. Nate Charlow, and at the University of St. Andrews, principally with Prof. Jessica Brown, who supervised my MLitt dissertation on contextualism in epistemology. Before that, I played music professionally.