My work in normative ethics focuses on the relationship between virtue, duty, and reasons. My work in metaethics focuses on explaining how we partly understand morality through our emotions. My work in philosophy of language focuses on modality, particularly deontic modality, and expressivism.

My dissertation argues that philosophers are mistaken to think that normative reasons are nothing over and above facts. Drawing inspiration from Davidson’s primary reasons, it argues that normative reasons are pairs of facts and goals, the contents of pro-attitudes. Because my view recognizes that reasons have both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects, I call it the dual aspect theory of normative reasons. My dissertation then explores how central ethical concepts like moral rightness and moral virtue look from the standpoint of the dual aspect theory of reasons.

I am a PhD candidate at the University of Southern California's Department of Philosophy. Before coming to USC, I studied philosophy at the University of Toronto, principally with Prof. Nate Charlow, and at the University of St. Andrews, principally with Prof. Jessica Brown, who supervised my MLitt dissertation on contextualism in epistemology. Before that, I played music professionally. You can listen to my past self here or watch some videos here.